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Armed Standoffs and the Warrant
Requirement
EDWARD H. ARENS*
The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment. So
that the keeping a man against his will in a private house.., is an
imprisonment.'
I looked out the back window and there was a fellow there kneeling,
dressed in black with a shotgun pointed at the house. And I then went
to the side window and looked out the side window and saw a man
there with a machine gun .... '
INTRODUCTION
William Bing had lost his job, broken up with his girlfriend, and
gone on a binge of drinking and huffing drugs? Adding insult to injury,
neighborhood kids would spend hours taunting Bing outside his house.4
By late afternoon on October 12, 2002, Bing had endured enough.' He
took a gun, went outside, and fired shots into the air.6 Neighbors called
the police, who soon arrived and ordered Bing, who had since gone back
inside, to come out and talk with them.7 Bing, however, refused to leave
his house.'
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.S.F.S., 2004, Georgetown
University, School of Foreign Service. My thanks to Professor James McCall for his comments, to
Professor Rory Little for his advice, and to the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their insights and
efforts. This Note is dedicated to Jacqueline, my parents, my brother, and my friends.
I. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *136.
2. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 81o, 815-16 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
3. Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 373 F. Supp. 2d 770,773 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 558-59.
8. Estate of Bing, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
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By then police were already drawing a perimeter around the house.9
Within the hour a Strategic Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team arrived
to force Bing out.'° They began by tossing a tactical phone through Bing's
window." When Bing refused to talk with them, they fired pepper gas
into the house. 2 Bing choked on the fumes but did not surrender. 3 The
SWAT team then broke down the front door with a battering ram, shone
a spotlight through the opening, and tossed a flash-bang grenade through
the bedroom window. 4 Still Bing refused to yield.'5 The SWAT team
finally assaulted the house and killed Bing when he resisted.'6 The flash-
bangs from the raid sparked a fire, burning the house to the fround.7
There was no warrant to arrest Bing, as nobody had sought one.
The Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York forbids police
from arresting suspects in their homes without a warrant or compelling
excuse. 9 Applying this principle to people like Bing, however, presents
significant Fourth Amendment problems. First, it is not clear when the
Fourth Amendment applies to police standoffs. Do police seize
barricaded suspects simply by surrounding a house? Or does the suspect
remain free until he or she surrenders or is physically subdued? Second,
Payton excuses a warrantless arrest when exigent circumstances would
have made getting a warrant impractical or dangerous. Barricaded
suspects, however, can hold out for days on end. Under these
circumstances, at what time does it become untenable for police to not
have a warrant? Put another way, can time alone terminate an exigency?
This Note explores these important questions. Part I discusses the
origins of Payton and examines its result. Part II examines the
development of the Court's Fourth Amendment seizure and exigent
circumstances doctrines. Part III surveys the causes and characteristics of
barricade situations and police procedures for resolving them. Part IV
examines how the lower courts have applied Payton to home standoffs.
Finally, Part V proposes a new Fourth Amendment framework for
handling encounters with barricaded suspects. First, a suspect is seized
when he is surrounded in his home and no longer free to ignore the
police. Second, courts should presume a warrant requirement when the
9. Id. at 773.
io. Estate of Bing, 456 F.3 d at 560.





16. Id. at 562.
17. Id.
8. Id. at 564.
19. 445 U.S. 573, 585, 590 (198o).
20. Id.
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police have time to plan for a standoff. When an unanticipated standoff
occurs, however, exigent circumstances last for so long as the police are
too busy to seek a warrant.
I. PAYTON V. NEW YORK AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
In principle, the Fourth Amendment reaches "all invasions.., of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."2' Yet before 198o the
government could enter a person's home without a warrant in order to
make an arrest. With the states and federal circuits fractured on the
constitutionality of this practice,22 the Supreme Court decided Payton v.
New York, holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from
entering a suspect's home without a warrant or consent in order to effect
his or her arrest.23 This decision is the basis for all further analysis of
armed standoffs.
The Court had approached, but not resolved, the issue of
warrantless home arrests prior to Payton. In 1948, the Court held in
Johnson v. United States that warrantless searches of private homes are
unconstitutional. 4 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court had
suggested in dicta that the same standard applied to arrests. 5 Although
the Court had upheld the constitutionality of warrantless seizures in
public places in United States v. Watson ,6 it had not decided whether to
treat seizures in private places differently. 7 Payton provided that
opportunity.
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
22. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-99 (198o). At the time Payton was decided,
twenty-three states had authorized warrantless home arrests, while fifteen states had prohibited the
practice. Id. at 598 n.46. In addition, state and federal courts within the same jurisdiction had reached
conflicting results. Compare People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 225 (N.Y. 1978) (finding entry for
purpose of making felony arrest, even without exigent circumstances, not a violation of the
Constitution), with United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that in the absence
of a warrant, or exigent circumstances, federal law enforcement is barred by the Fourth Amendment
from entering to make a felony arrest).
23. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576.
24. 333 U.S. -o, 16-17 (1948).
25. See 403 U.S. 443,477-78 (97).
[T]he notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in order to arrest him on probable
cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrant are per se
unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well defined "exigent
circumstances."
Id. The Court had, again in dicta, made a similar observation in Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493,
499-500 (1958) (stating that warrantless nighttime entry to effect an arrest presents a "grave
constitutional question"). Though both Jones and Coolidge had referred to nighttime entries, courts
interpreted them loosely to apply equally to daytime entries. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 613 (White, J.,
dissenting).
26. 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
27. See id. at 433 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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In Payton, the Court considered warrantless home arrests made by
police acting under a New York law that authorized police to enter
private residences to make routine felony arrests. 8 Beginning with the
premise that arrest is "'quintessentially a seizure"'29 and therefore within
the Fourth Amendment's rubric,"0 the Court distinguished seizure on
private premises from seizure in public areas," thereby declining to
extend Watson to home arrests.32 The Court then addressed whether it
should treat warrantless arrests more leniently than warrantless
searches.33 While acknowledging that "the area that may legally be
searched is broader when executing a search warrant than when
executing an arrest warrant[,]" the Court declined to make a distinction
on these grounds.34 Instead, it laid a blanket prohibition: "the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant.,
35
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES AND THE DOCTRINE OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
The line Payton drew, however, has been anything but firm. Courts
applying Payton must resolve three important questions left unanswered
in the opinion. First, under what circumstances is a person considered
seized? Second, when seized, how does one determine on what side of
the home's "threshold" the person was? And third, what are the exigent
circumstances that excuse warrantless entry?,
6
A. IDENTIFYING THE MOMENT OF SEIZURE: SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
Not every interaction between the police and citizens implicates the
Fourth Amendment.37 Rather, an encounter must rise to the level of a
"seizure" to trigger constitutional scrutiny." At common law, seizure of
28. Payton, 445 U.S. at 574.
29. Id. at 585 (quoting Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring)).
30. See id. at 585.
31. See id. at 586-89.
32. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLum. L. REV. 1739,
1764 (2000). Watson's balance of governmental and individual interests does not translate to private
homes. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Instead, where "the warrantless arrest is in
the suspect's home, that same balancing requires that, absent exigent circumstances, the result be the
other way." Id.
33. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 590.
36. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. I, 185-86 (1980) (noting that Payton did
not define exigent circumstances).
37. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 19 n.i6 (1968).
38. Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129, 142 (2003).
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the person was synonymous with arrest.39 The Court relaxed this
standard in Terry v. Ohio,4' which expanded the seizure concept into two
categories: arrests requiring probable cause, and stops based upon only
reasonable suspicion.' A person stopped by police could now be seized
without having been arrested.42 The question then becomes what exactly
the police must do to seize someone.
Under Terry, police could seize a person in two ways: through
physical force or an intimidating show of authority.43 Seizing a person by
physical force is easy to understand.' The slightest application of force,
such as merely laying a hand on the suspect, is a seizure.45 The only
limitation is that the government must have acted purposely. 6 Seizure,
therefore, occurs only "when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied."7 A fleeing
suspect, for example, is seized when he crashes his car into a police
roadblock designed to stop him,48 but is not seized when a pursuing
police car accidentally runs into him.49
The second way for police to seize a person is through a restraining
show of authority." A street encounter with the police is the classic
example. A policeman has every right to approach a person on the street
to ask a question.' But the citizen is similarly free to ignore the
policeman and walk away.52 If the policeman then orders the citizen to
stop (or draws his gun), the freedom is lost and the citizen seized. 3 But
what happens if the citizen starts running away?
The Court answered this question in California v. Hodari D., holding
that a person is not seized until he or she submits to the officer's show of
authority. 4 In Hodari D., a young man had tossed aside some drugs while
39. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1978). Police needed the same probable cause
showing to seize a suspect as they would to make an arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
635 (i99) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 392 U.S. at i.
41. Clancy, supra note 38, at 146-47.
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
43. Id. at I4; Clancy, supra note 38, at 161.
44. See Clancy, supra note 38, at 161.
45. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (i99).
46. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,596 (1989).
47. Id. at 597.
48. Id. at 598-99 ("We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very
instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.").
49. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 597).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 19 n.I6 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553
(198o).
51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
52. See id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. See id. at I9 n.I6 (demonstrating "a show of authority").
54. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (i9i).
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being chased by police officers.55 The question before the Court was
whether the police had seized the defendant simply by chasing him.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began by observing that arrests
are the "quintessential 'seizure of the person"' for Fourth Amendment
purposes.' He therefore turned to the common law of arrest to define
the concept of seizure. 7
At common law, an arrest occurred when a police officer
purposefully obtained custody over a suspect., Custody, in turn, entailed
either physical touching of the person or submission to the officer's
authority. 9 The same was true for seizure, which at common law
"connoted not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the
animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within
physical control." ' From this, Scalia reasoned that no seizure could occur
from mere pursuit: "An arrest requires either physical force.., or, where
that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority., 6, When a person
does not submit to the show of authority, "there is at most an attempted
seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned. ' '6' Therefore,
police do not seize a resisting suspect unless they use physical force.
63
The problem with this seizure test is that it does not consider those
times "when an individual's submission to a show of governmental
authority takes the form of passive acquiescence." 64 Submission can look
a lot like consent. For example, a driver who pulls over during a traffic
stop has interrupted her freedom of movement because of the flashing
lights of a police car.6' This is clearly submission. But has the officer also
seized the driver's passengers? They could not submit to the flashing
lights because they were not driving. If they then stay in the car during
the stop, did they consent to it, or submit to it?
66
55. Id. at 623.
56. Id. at 624.
57. See id.
58. Clancy, supra note 38, at 141.
59. Id.
6o. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624.
61. Id. at 626 (arguing that seizure "does not remotely apply ... to the prospect of a policeman
yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee.").
62. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007).
63. See State v. Young, 717 N.W.2d 729,742 (Wis. 2006).
Because Mendenhall and its progeny did not confront the situation where a person refuses
to yield to a show of authority, the Hodari D. court found the Mendenhall test
insufficient... [t]he Mendenhall test applies when the subject of police attention is either
subdued by force or submits to a show of authority. Where, however, a person flees in
response to a show of authority, Hodari D. governs when the seizure occurs.
Id.
64. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2405.
65. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a
Seizure Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRUM. L REV. 619, 623-24 (1990).
66. The Court's (unanimous) answer is that a police officer seizes both the driver and her
[VOL. 59:1517
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The Court developed an objective seizure test in United States v.
Mendenhall and Florida v. Royer6 to "tellQ when a seizure occurs in
response to authority, and when it does not." Under this test, "a person
has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave."7 This
"imprecise" standard assesses the coercive effect of police conduct,
looking to both police actions and surrounding circumstances to decide
whether an individual would reasonably feel restrained.7' Police seize a
person when their conduct causes that person to reasonably believe "that
he [is] not free to disregard the police presence and go about his
business.""
Even with this test, however, drawing the line between an innocent
encounter and an impermissible seizure is often difficult.73 For instance,
an airline passenger stopped by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
agents is "free to leave" even after the agents ask for her ticket and
driver's license.74 If the agents keep her ticket, however, and ask her to
accompany them to a police office, the passenger is seized.75
The objective test also applies when the person's location makes
dealing with the police oppressive. In considering the search of a bus
passenger, the Court refused to say that the suspect had been "free to
leave" because the suspect's "movement [had been] restricted by a factor
independent of police conduct" -in other words, he was stuck on a bus.7"
The Court likened the freedom to leave to the freedom to stay put:
"[W]hen the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the
degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could
leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the
encounter."77 Accordingly, "[i]n such a situation, the appropriate inquiry
passengers during a traffic stop. See Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2403.
67. 446 U.S. 544 (I98O).
68. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
69. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2405.
70. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. A plurality of the Court adopted this definition in Royer, 460
U.S. 491. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 639 (199) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
72. Id. at 576.
73. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560 n.I (Powell, J., concurring) ("For me, the question
whether the respondent in this case reasonably could have thought she was free to 'walk away' when
asked by two Government agents for her driver's license and ticket is extremely close.").
74. Id. at 555.
75. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-03; see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 570 n.3 (White, J., dissenting)
("It is doubtful that any reasonable person about to board a plane would feel free to leave when law
enforcement officers have her plane ticket.").
76. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,431, 436 (1991).
77. Id. at 435-36.
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is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
78
Having defined a seizure, a second issue is to define the role of a
seizure within the context of an arrest. "A seizure is a single act, and not
a continuous fact." 9 Seizure caused by physical contact with a suspect,
therefore, does not effect a continuing seizure if the suspect subsequently
escapes.8° Once the suspect is free, the Fourth Amendment no longer
applies to him." Where the suspect remains in custody, however, he or
she remains seized. While seizure may be "a single act, and not a
continuous fact[,] [plossession, which follows seizure, is continuous."'"
B. THE LOCATION OF THE SUSPECT AT THE MOMENT OF SEIZURE GOVERNS
WHETHER THE PAYTON WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLIES
For Payton to apply to a given case, the arrestee must have been
seized inside the threshold of his or her home. While the facts in Payton
were clear enough for the Court to draw a "firm line" at the home's
threshold, different scenarios have led courts to adopt a more malleable
standard. On the one hand, police may arrest suspects who stand in full
view at the threshold of an open door and then retreat into the home.8
3
On the other hand, police need a warrant to arrest suspects who expose
themselves involuntarily or under coercion."4 In United States v. Johnson,
for example, Secret Service agents knocked on the suspect's door and
identified themselves with fictitious names." Once the suspect opened
the door, the agents, with weapons drawn, revealed their true identities
and arrested him. 6 In addressing whether the arrest was made inside the
home,87 the Ninth Circuit held that it is "the location of the arrested
person, and not of the arresting agents, that determines whether an
arrest occurs within [the] home." To hold otherwise, the court observed,
would allow the police to "avoid illegal 'entry' into a home simply by
remaining outside the doorway and controlling the movements of
suspects within through the use of weapons that greatly extend the
78. Id. at 436.
79. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (i991) (quoting Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (i8
Wall.) 457,471 (1873)).
8o. Id.
81. Id. (noting that had the youth been grabbed by the officer, broken free, and then thrown away
the drugs, he would not have tossed the drugs in the course of an arrest).
82. Thompson, 85 U.S. (I8 Wall.) at 471.
83. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (976).
84. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. i98o).
85. Id. at 755.
86. Id.
87. The suspect was arrested when he "was first confronted by the agents with their guns drawn."
Id. The court reached this conclusion by determining if the suspect reasonably would have felt himself
free to leave under the circumstances. Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968)).
88. Id. at 757.
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,reach' of the arresting officers.""s Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held
that a suspect who emerges from his home in response to coercive police
conduct has been arrested within the home.9" Therefore, the warrant
requirement applies both when police enter a home without a warrant
and when police force a suspect to leave his home under coercive
circumstances. Because hostage/barricade incidents normally involve
either police entry or forced surrender, Payton applies to nearly every
instance. The inquiry, therefore, becomes not so much where the arrest
took place, but when the arrest took place.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE PAYTON WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Court has "almost invariably accord[ed] deep respect" for
privacy in the home, even in the presence of "weighty countervailing
interests."'" The only interests important enough to be exceptions to the
Payton warrant requirement are those based on exigent circumstances.9"
Exigent circumstances are situations where the police must take
immediate action without a warrant to effectively make an arrest.93 This
section will discuss the formulation and scope of modern exigency
doctrine, focusing on the two factors relevant to finding any exigency:
danger and the need for immediate action.
i. Circumstances That Create an Exigency
In theory, exigency exceptions to the general warrant rule are few in
number, specifically established, and carefully delineated.94 The central
exception is when delaying an arrest would put lives in danger. "The
Fourth Amendment," the Court has stated, "does not require police
officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others."95 While this allowance
is the most important for purposes of this Note, there are several others
that are relevant to analyzing armed standoffs.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, ii66 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that the suspect who
appeared in doorway only because of coercive police activity was arrested "while he was present inside
a private home"); see also United States v. AI-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
suspect who emerged from home under police coercion was arrested within the home).
91. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787,853 0999).
92. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (i98o); Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456
F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) ("A 'person may not be arrested at home without a warrant, regardless of
the existence of probable cause, absent exigent circumstances.") (quoting United States v. Bradley,
922 F.2d 1290, 1293 (6th Cir. i99I)).
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004) (defining exigent circumstances); see also Fisher
v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The exigency exception can excuse a warrant
for an in-home arrest when probable cause exists and there is a compelling reason for not obtaining a
warrant....").
94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
95. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
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Dorman v. United States provides a widely adopted framework for
identifying an exigency."6 The test balances the following factors: (i) the
gravity and violence of the offense; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably
believed to be armed, so that delay may increase the danger to the
community or to officers at the time of arrest; (3) whether there was
"beyond a clear showing of probable cause" that the suspect committed
the offense; (4) whether there was "strong reason to believe" the suspect
was on the premises; (5) the likelihood that the suspect would escape if
not swiftly apprehended; and (6) whether the entry was peaceful.' The
government has the "heavy burden" of proving these factors created
exigent circumstances to such an extent that they "could not brook the
delay incident to obtaining a warrant."'' Each of the Dorman factors
applies to barricade situations, and it is beyond the range of this Note to
examine every one of them. Instead, this section will quickly survey
several factors relevant to barricaded suspects.
The first Dorman factor is the degree of the crime." The gravity of
the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made is important
enough that exigent circumstances will rarely apply when police believe
the suspect committed only a minor crime." Having said that, the gravity
of the crime alone is not enough to justify warrantless entry.' Therefore,
while police are less likely to need a warrant when the crime is serious,
the circumstances of the case may nonetheless make a warrant necessary.
The most important Dorman factor for standoffs is whether the
barricaded suspect is armed and a danger to people inside and/or outside
of the home. Knowledge that a suspect is armed or has a propensity for
violence may create an exigency."° Accordingly, police do not have to
96. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); see also Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443, 447
(8th Cir. 199o); United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 199o); United States v. Blake,
632 F.2d 731 733 (9th Cir. 198o); United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d ii86, 1189-9o (6th Cir. 1978).
97. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392-93; MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 769-7 o .
98. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392.
99. Id.
IOO. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,753 (1984).
ioi. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (978) ("We decline to hold that the seriousness of
the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth
Amendment justify a warrantless search."); see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 752 (noting that "courts have
permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent of the
gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest").
102. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 323 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding exigency under the
totality of the circumstances where suspect "had a reputation for violence and was in fact apprehended
with a loaded automatic weapon within his reach"); MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770 ("[T]he volatile mix
of drug sales, loaded weapons and likely drug abuse presented a clear and immediate danger to the
law enforcement agents and the public at large."). But see State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn.
1989), affd, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, IOo-oI (199
o ) (finding no danger exigency because "the
suspect was known not to be the murderer but thought to be the driver of the getaway car" and "[tihe
police had already recovered the murder weapon").
[Vol. 59:1517
ARMED STANDOFFS AND WARRANTS
secure a warrant when a suspect has threatened to kill an informer, I3 or
where police know the suspect is armed and had been using his gun "to
intimidate or injure. ' This exigency also applies where the suspect is an
immediate threat to others in the house, such as hostages or family
members." On the other hand, knowledge that a suspect is armed does
not always create an exigency, and commentators have argued for
explicit proof that delay would present an immediate threat to hfe.
Regardless, police knowledge that a suspect is armed is an important
factor towards a finding of exigent circumstances.
The possibility of escape also justifies warrantless entry. Police may
force entry when there is a clear likelihood of escape or when they notice
signs of impending flight.' 7 In conspiracy cases, the arrest of one
conspirator often requires the police to arrest the others lest they
become suspicious of the arrestee's absence and flee. Police also have
grounds to make a warrantless arrest when delay would risk the suspect's
attempting a violent escape."'9 But courts refuse to find exigent
circumstances when the police have surrounded a house so that the
suspect had no legitimate chance of escaping."
The last exigency factor, not discussed in Dorman, is hot pursuit.
Police do not need a warrant to enter a home when they are in hot
pursuit of a fleeing suspect."' This exception only covers "immediate or
continuous pursuit.., from the scene of a crime .... It does not apply, for
instance, when a drunk driving suspect has abandoned his car at the
scene of an accident, walked home, and gotten into bed by the time the
103. See United States v. Padilla, 869 F.2d 372, 380 (8th Cir. 1989).
104. See United States v. McNeal, 77 F.3 d 938, 946 (7th Cir. 1996).
105. See Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that police
knowledge that suspect "was armed and volatile and that his wife and child were in the house with
him" justified warrantless entry because officers could reasonably conclude the suspect was "an
immediate threat" to his wife and son).
io6. See William C. Donnino & Anthony J. Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home
Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90, 100-01 (1980).
107. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770-71.
io8. See, e.g., United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 768 (ist Cir. 1996) (rejecting the argument that
police could have allayed exigency by staging a phone call from an arrested co-conspirator); see also
Padilla, 869 F.2d at 379-80.
IO9. Padilla, 869 F.2d at 380 (finding an exigency where police reasonably believed the suspect
"might have attempted a violent escape if more time had passed without word from his co-
conspirators"); see also United States v. Standridge, 81o F.2d 1034, 1037 (iith Cir. 1987) ("It was safer
to arrest Standridge immediately by surprise in his motel room, than to wait for a warrant, and to risk
a gun battle erupting in the halls, stairs, lobby or other public areas of the fully occupied hotel should
Standridge try to escape.").
1io. See State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989) (noting that because three or four police
squads surrounded the house, "[ilt was evident the suspect was going nowhere. If he came out of the
house he would have been promptly apprehended.").
iii. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (976); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967).
112. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,753 (1984).
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police arrive."3 Under such circumstances, the police need a warrant
before they may enter the home to arrest the suspect."'4
2. The Role of Time in Exigency Analysis
The ubiquitous factor underlying exigency cases is time. Exigencies
only exist when police are so preoccupied with investigating the crime
and pursuing the perpetrator that they have no time left to obtain a
warrant without risking destruction of evidence, escape, or danger to the
public."5 The task of the courts is to "balance the significance of the risk
of the purported compelling need for official action, against the time
necessary to secure a warrant.""..6
It is hard for courts to judge police preoccupation ex ante. They may
look for guidance, however, in two cases involving warrantless property
seizures. In United States v. Place, the Court recognized the right of
police to briefly detain and investigate luggage based on reasonable
suspicion."' It explained, however, that the brevity of the intrusion is
important to its legitimacy, and that "in assessing the effect of the length
of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently
pursue their investigation."" 8 The Court held that detaining a suspect's
luggage for ninety minutes to check for drugs was unreasonable, in part
because the police could have arranged for a drug-sniffing dog in
advance and thus shortened the length of the investigation."9 The Court
used the same analysis in United States v. Sharpe when considering the
twenty-minute detention of a truck.' Drawing on Place, the Court
stated:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified
as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant."'
The Court strongly cautioned against judicial second guessing,
stating that "[t]he question is not simply whether some other alternative
was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to
recognize or to pursue it .... Because the police in Sharpe had spent
twenty minutes investigating the truck in a "diligent and reasonable
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Donnino & Girese, supra note io6, at 95-96.
116. Id. at96.
117. 462 U.S. 696,7o6 (1983).
118. Id. at 709.
II9. Id. at 709-10.
120. 470 U.S. 675,686 (1985).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 687.
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manner," taking no more time than was necessary, the detention was
reasonable. 23
The reasoning behind these cases often applies to exigency analysis.
Using the Place and Sharpe analysis, exigent circumstances would apply
for so long as the police respond reasonably, diligently, and quickly to
prevent the destruction of evidence, escape, or danger to the public. But
when a diligent response lapses into simple waiting, the police must use
that time to secure a warrant.
A second way to balance the time needed to get a warrant against
the need to make the arrest is to distinguish "planned" arrests from
arrests made in the course of an ongoing investigation."4 Under this
approach, police make a "planned" arrest when their investigation is
complete before they set out to arrest a suspect."5 Such circumstances
will rarely justify a warrantless arrest.126 On the other hand, the
presumption shifts towards warrantless arrest when the occasion for
arrest arises while the police are out "in the field" investigating the
crime.2 7 In these cases, "the probabilities are high that it is not feasible
for the police to delay the arrest while one of their number leaves the
area, finds a magistrate and obtains a warrant, and then returns with
it." ' 2 By eliminating the preference for warrants, moreover, courts would
not speculate ex ante whether police could have staked out the suspect or
otherwise delayed until they had obtained a warrant.'29 Giving police the
benefit of the doubt would thus free them to choose the best time to
arrest, not the time required by an exigency or a warrant.
III. BARRICADED SUSPECTS
It is impossible to know how courts should apply the Fourth
Amendment to standoffs without understanding what causes standoffs
and what resolves them safely. Hostage and barricade situations are very
common. Unlike the famous sieges from the i99os involving religious
and political extremists at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, most
standoffs involve individual suspects whose motivation is influenced by
psychological illness, substance abuse, or extreme emotional stress.3 '
123. Id.
124. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.i(f)
(4th ed. 2007).
125. Id.
126. Id. (stating that the exigency must have arisen prior to the police setting out to make the
arrest, such as when the police learn a suspect plans to flee the area).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. ("[T]he question of whether a stakeout is or is not feasible is itself a complicated one, and
is unlikely to be seen by hindsight in precisely the same way it was perceived by the police on the
scene.").
13o. Theodore B. Feldmann, The Role of Mental Health Consultants on Hostage Negotiation
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Police categorize all standoffs, regardless of cause, as either hostage or
nonhostage situations."' Understanding the difference between the two
types of situations is paramount to a peaceful resolution.'32
A hostage situation occurs when a suspect holds one or more
persons against their will, conditioning their release on the fulfillment of
certain conditions.'33 Hostage takers are goal oriented and purposeful,
using their captives as leverage to achieve their goals.'34 They take
hostages to facilitate escape from a crime scene, draw attention to their
political beliefs, or seek a change in government policy.'33 Keeping
hostages alive is in their interest, and therefore they avoid actions that
might trigger a violent response from police."6
On the other hand, suspects sometimes hold others captive to
retaliate for a perceived personal wrong, such as infidelity or a spouse's
threatening to leave.'37 Because the suspect is using the captive to express
anger, and not as leverage, such events are not hostage situations.
Suspects in nonhostage situations are isolated, angry, and uninterested in
demands because they "neither need nor want anything from the
police."' 39 They act out because they cannot cope:
Unable to control their emotions in response to life's many stressors,
they are motivated by anger, rage, frustration, hurt, confusion, or
depression. They have no clear goals and often exhibit purposeless,
self-defeating behavior. Such individuals have either no substantive or
escape demands or totally unrealistic demands for which they would
have no reasonable expectation of fulfillment. Disgruntled employees,
jilted lovers, rejected spouses, aggrieved individuals, idealistic fanatics,
individuals with mental illness, and others with unfulfilled aspirations
who feel that they have been wronged by others or events fall into this
broad category... [a]ngry, confused, and frustrated, they may express
Teams, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Dec. I, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/
displayarticle/Io168/58776.
131. Gary W. Noesner, Negotiation Concepts for Commanders, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan.
1999, at 7, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/I999/jan99leb.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Feldmann, supra note 130.
134. Noesner, supra note 131.
135. Feldmann, supra note 130.
136. Noesner, supra note 131.
137. Feldmann, supra note 130.
138. Noesner, supra note 131, at 8.
During nonhostage situations, individuals barricade themselves or hold others against their
will, not to gain leverage over police to achieve a specific goal but to express their anger
over events or at the individual they hold. In such cases, the person being held technically is
not a hostage, used to secure fulfillment of a demand, but a victim whom the subject
contemplates harming.
Id.; see also Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 502 (6th Cir. 2002).
139. Noesner, supra note 131, at 8: see also Feldmann, supra note 13o. Feldmann uses the term
"barricade situation" to refer to nonhostage situations.
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their anger and vent their frustrations by undertaking actions that
bring them into conflict with law enforcement.
4
Mental illness plays a particularly important role in nonhostage
standoffs, accounting for up to 50% of all barricaded suspects.'
4 ' Of those
diagnosed with psychiatric abnormalities, personality disorders, mood
disorders, and substance abuse are the most common conditions.'
42 The
most common precipitating factors for a nonhostage situation are
interpersonal disputes or grievances, followed by criminal acts and
mental illness.'43 Because barricaded suspects are so emotionally
unstable, the likelihood of violence is much greater in nonhostage
situations than in hostage situations.'" The most frequent location for
nonhostage situations, accounting for over 40% of all incidents, is the
home. 45
At the outset of any crisis, police and negotiators must establish
whether they are confronting a hostage or nonhostage situation.' 46 The
first step is to make contact with the suspect and then to learn about the
suspect's background, motivations, and whether the suspect is holding
anyone captive.' 47 Once the police know what type of crisis they are
dealing with, they may choose an appropriate strategy. For hostage
events, police should bargain with the hostage takers, all the while using
"highly visible containment strategies to demonstrate to the subject that
the police are willin§ and able to use force if necessary" to bring the
standoff to a halt. 4 In contrast, "police should handle nonhostage
incidents using a low-profile containment scheme that is less
confrontative and demonstrates peaceful intentions."'49 Calming the
suspect is crucial. Police should keep the suspect engaged, and should not
wait for tactical teams to deploy before allowing negotiators to contact
the suspect. 5° Because barricaded individuals are frequently disturbed
and emotional, continuous conversation lessens tension, decreases the
suspect's paranoia, and thereby decreases his or her propensity to act
14o. Noesner, supra note 131, at 8.
141. Feldmann, supra note 130.
142. Id.
143. Id. Feldmann, in a study of 12o hostage/barricade incidents, divided standoff episodes into six
categories: personal and domestic disputes (30.83%), criminal acts (25.83%), mental illness (19.17%),
workplace violence (11.67%), alcohol and drugs (7.50%), and students (5.00%). See id. at 26 fig.I.
144. See Noesner, supra note 131, at 8 (stating that the potential for murder followed by suicide is
very high" where a barricaded suspect is holding captives).
145. Feldmann, supra note 130. Nonhostage situations occur most frequently in private residences
(42.50%), followed by restaurants and bars (IO.83%), and convenience stores (7.50%).
146. See Noesner, supra note 131, at IO.
147. Feldmann, supra note 130.
148. Noesner, supra note 131.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 9.
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violently. 5' Police should avoid manipulating a suspect's anxiety by
breaking windows, tossing rocks on the roof, or playing loud music,
because doing so "only serves to reinforce the suspect's suspicions about
law enforcement's intentions.""'5 Above all else, police should recognize
and avoid pressures to move the confrontation along. For barricaded
suspects, the best policy is often to talk and to wait.'
53
Officers should use force only when lack of progress reasonably
poses an increased risk to the suspect or his or her captives.' 4
Intervention is a last resort because it is so risky.'55 Others advance more
assertive approaches, however. For instance, SWAT team protocols
entail: "i. Contain and isolate the suspect; then attempt to negotiate a
surrender. 2. If unsuccessful, demand that the suspect surrender. 3. If
unsuccessful, use chemical weapons to force the suspect to surrender. 4.
If unsuccessful, use snipers to neutralize the suspect. 5. If unsuccessful,
order a SWAT assault."'' 6 While this approach is certain to end standoffs,
it is not certain to end them peacefully. Indeed, some criticize SWAT
teams for escalating the high-risk situations they are supposed to
resolve.'57
The consensus is that police should tread warily when dealing with
volatile, barricaded suspects.' 5 They should engage the suspect in
dialogue, displaying patience and understanding.'59 They must be willing
to make concessions.' Above all, they must calm the suspect down to
minimize the chance for violence. 6' Hostage and barricade situations are
"fluid events influenced by variables both internal and external to the
event." '' Securing a peaceful resolution requires a continuous, delicate,
and error-free effort." In these circumstances, time is not a factor."4




154. See id. at io.
155. Id.
156. See ROBERT L. SNOW, SWAT TEAMS 76 (1996).
157. See Megan Twohey, SWATs Under Fire, NAT'L J., Jan. i, 2000, at 38.
158. The FBI has encapsulated this idea by requiring agents to ask the following before every
action: "i) is the contemplated action necessary? 2) is the contemplated action risk-effective? and 3) is




162. Feldmann, supra note 130.
163. For example, negotiators must work seamlessly with tactical teams to coordinate deliveries,
releases of captives, and surrenders from barricaded suspects. Every step in the process must be
properly executed. Suspects feel misled when they do not receive things the government has promised.
Such simple misunderstandings can lead to violence. See Noesner, supra note 131, at 12.
164. Id. ("It is nearly impossible to predict with certainty the duration of an incident.") That police
should exercise patience in handling dangerous events is hardly limited to barricade situations. In
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These principles are often at odds with the judicial framework for
seizure and exigency. Instead of looking to the appropriateness of police
actions, courts applying Payton focus on the temporal aspects of a
standoff. Standoffs, however, are dynamic and ill suited to an analysis
that only asks when the seizure occurred and whether it was made during
an exigency. This Note will now examine how courts have applied the
Payton framework to home standoffs.
IV. APPLYING PAYTON PRINCIPLES TO STANDOFFS WITH ARMED AND
BARRICADED SUSPECTS
Applying the Payton warrant requirement to barricade situations is
hard in many ways. Pinpointing when a seizure occurs is difficult, for
instance, when police use extremely coercive measures but the suspect
refuses to surrender. Even when courts have found the suspect was
seized, they struggle to find an exigency when hours passed between the
establishment of probable cause and the moment of arrest. For both
issues, the result often depends on the complicated circumstances of each
individual case.
The facts of standoff cases are complex and dynamic, as exemplified
by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fisher v. City of San Jose.6' Steven
Fisher had been drinking beer in his apartment while watching the World
Series and cleaning his large collection of antique rifles. 6 Around
midnight, a security guard arrived to talk to Fisher about a noise
complaint.' Fisher quickly unnerved him, however, with his guns, visible
drunkenness, and enthusiasm for the Second Amendment. 68 Police were
soon on the way. 6, Upon arriving outside Fisher's apartment, an officer
tried to get Fisher's attention by tossing pebbles at a sliding glass door. 7 '
Fisher approached the door but did not exit the apartment. 7' The officer,
however, noticed he was drunk.7 2 By that time, Fisher was the only
person in the apartment.'73 More and more police came upon the scene,
including a hostage negotiator who arrived between three and four
o'clock in the morning.74 When she contacted Fisher, he invited her into
excessive force cases, the desire to resolve a potentially dangerous situation quickly is not a substantial
government objective justifying the use of serious force. See, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272,
1281 (9th Cir. 2001).
165. 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007).
166. Fisher had bought two twelve-packs of beer and owned eighteen rifles. Id. at 954. As Judge
Berzon wryly put it, "[b]oth the guns and the beer figured prominently in the ensuing events." Id.
167. Id. at 954-55.









his apartment but threatened to shoot her if she came in.' Allegedly, he
pointed a gun in her direction., 6 Based on these threatening acts, a police
tactical team arrived and set about forcing Fisher from his apartment.77
After evacuating the neighborhood, they cut Fisher's power at 8:48 a.m.
and tossed a throw phone through the sliding glass door.17 At 10:52 a.m.,
they used flash-bang devices to stun Fisher. 79 Two hours later, they
threw in tear gas.' 8 Finally, after two o'clock in the afternoon, Fisher
contacted police using the throw phone and surrendered. 8' No one had
seen Fisher carrying a weapon since 6:30 a.m. 8' All told, over sixty
officers had been involved in the standoff, including some early
responders who returned to the station house in the morning to write
police reports.8 ' The police had used sirens, bullhorns, snipers, water
cannons, armored vehicles, and tear gas to drive Fisher out."8 No one
had sought a warrant, or told Fisher he was under arrest.' 85
A. IDENTIFYING THE POINT OF SEIZURE: Do POLICE SEIZE THE
SURROUNDED OCCUPANTS OF A HOUSE?
The simplest type of seizure possible in a police standoff is when the
suspect surrenders to police. Some standoffs, however, do not end in
surrender. Even for the majority that do, the suspect has almost always
been seized before he or she chose to give in. 6 Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment usually becomes an issue at some point during the standoff.
This section examines how the courts have applied Fourth Amendment
seizure analysis to standoff situations.
i. The Inapplicability of the "Free to Leave" Test to Extended
Standoffs
The first category of seizure analysis for armed standoffs involves
suspects who surrender soon after being surrounded. For example, in
United States v. Morgan, nine police officers surrounded the defendant's
home and summoned the occupants with a bullhorn. s7 The defendant
175. Id.
176. Id.





182. Id. at 966.
183. Id. at 967.
184. Brief of Appellee at 6, Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475 F.3d io49 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 04-
16095).
i85. Fisher, 509 F.3 d at 956.
i86. See infra Part IV.A.-B. In no case cited therein was a suspect first seized at the time they
surrendered to the police.
187. See United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1i6i (6th Cir. 1984).
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quickly appeared at the front door, and surrendered shortly thereafter.'"
To determine the moment of seizure, the court applied the objective
"free to leave" test and found that, because of the police show of
authority, the defendant "was placed under arrest.., at the moment the
police encircled the residence."'' s This seemingly would establish that
surrounding a house seizes its occupants.
But that statement is too broad. The "free to leave" test applied in
Morgan because the defendant had left his home, and the only question
was whether his acquiescence was voluntary or compelled. The test's sole
purpose is to look to the defendant's acts and ask whether or not they
were consensual. In Morgan, the court concluded that the defendant had
left the house only because the police ordered him to.'" This meant he
was seized inside the house, and that the warrant requirement applied to
him.'9I
The problem is that the "free to leave" test depends on the suspect's
quick surrender. The test is based on the causal link between the police
action and the suspect's behavior. When the police ordered Morgan out
of his house and he complied, the police order reasonably caused
Morgan to leave. This can be a seizure, and it occurred inside the home
because that was where Morgan was when he decided to comply. But the
causal chain weakens when the person does not leave when the police
order him to. If Morgan had taken six hours to leave the house, it is
unlikely that his decision to leave was reasonably caused by the police
order six hours earlier. It is even less likely then that the initial
encirclement of the house seized Morgan, because the encirclement did
not cause him to submit. This shows us two things: that the police do not
always seize the occupants of a home by surrounding it, and that the
objective "free to leave" test should not apply to long standoffs.
2. Seizure Without Force or Submission
Long, violent sieges are a constitutional paradox: the police may
confine a resisting suspect within the four walls of his home, menace the
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1164.
19o. Id. at 1I66.
191. The court's holding was that, in the absence of an actual entry, warrantless arrest of a suspect
who emerges from the home in response to coercive police activity violates the Fourth Amendment.
Id. ("Although there was no direct police entry into the Morgan home prior to Morgan's arrest, the
constructive entry accomplished the same thing, namely, the arrest of Morgan."); see also United
States v. A1-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 89o, 893 (9th Cir. 1985).
In the case at bar, the police had completely surrounded appellee's trailer with their
weapons drawn and ordered him through a bullhorn to leave the trailer and drop to his
knees. Appellee was not free to leave, his freedom of movement was totally restricted, and
the officers' show of force and authority was overwhelming. Any reasonable person would
have believed he was under arrest in these circumstances ... [w]e affirm the district court's
ruling that appellee was arrested inside his residence without a warrant.
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suspect with floodlights and tanks, and yet not seize the suspect until he
surrenders or is forcibly subdued. To avoid this result, courts have
stretched Fourth Amendment seizure doctrine to its limits. This section
examines the theories under which courts have found that police can
seize a resisting and barricaded suspect.
a. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick
One of the most notable and troubling standoff cases is the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Ewolski v. City of Brunswick.9 ' In Ewolski, health
services called police about the suspect, a paranoid schizophrenic who
was allegedly holding his wife and son captive in their home.'93 The police
knew the suspect was armed and would shoot at them if confronted.'94
Nonetheless, two officers went to the suspect's house, dressed in civilian
clothes to conceal their identities.'95 When the suspect refused to let them
in, the officers kicked down the door."96 The suspect shot at the officers,
hitting one.'97 The officers retreated and an Emergency Response Team
(ERT) arrived to surround the home and evacuate neighbors.' 8 Despite
reservations by two health professionals, police stormed the house
around seven o'clock in the evening, but were repulsed in a shootout that
left two more officers wounded."' The police continued to speak with the
suspect, who refused to surrender and became increasingly incoherent as
the standoff went on." At three o'clock the next morning the suspect
asked to speak to a priest, indicating he was contemplating suicide."0 '
Amazingly, the police decided to increase the pressure by driving an
armored truck onto the lawn to illuminate the house, and then ramming
it into the house to dispense tear gas." 2 In response, the suspect shot his
son and himself. 3
It fell to the court to decide whether encirclement of the suspect's
home was a Fourth Amendment seizure. The court held that though the
police had never taken the suspect into custody, the intrusiveness of the
standoff qualified "as an intentional application of physical force and
192. 287 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2002).
193. See id. at 497.
194. Id. at 497-98. From the outset, police had told home health services that the suspect presented
"a potential stand-off situation." Id. at 497.




199. Id. at 499 ("Pursuant to the assault plan, the ERT team threw incendiary devices into the
house while using a battering ram to break open the front door. Tear gas was also used during the
assault.").
200. Id. at 498-99.
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show of authority made with the intent of acquiring physical control.,
24
Implicit in this holding are two distinct rationales: that intrusive
encirclement of the home is the same as applying physical force to its
inhabitants, and that surrounding a home with intent to arrest seizes the
intended arrestee.
The first question is whether home confinement can really equate to
physical force. The Ewolski court applied Brower v. County of Inyo, a
case where police seized a fleeing motorcyclist through physical force by
intentionally causing him to crash into a blockade."5 But invoking
Brower is a stretch because police seized that suspect by causing his body
to collide-fatally--into a roadblock.o 6 By contrast, the police in Ewolski
never physically touched the suspect."° To illustrate this concept,
suppose the fleeing teenager from Hodari D. had run into a dead-end
alley, giving him no chance of escape. Trapped in the alley, he is caught
for all practical purposes, even though he hasn't surrendered or been
touched. If Ewolski is right, then the teenager is seized at this moment.
But merely curbing the liberty of a resisting suspect is not a seizure.
The problem is that the Sixth Circuit has conflated physical force and
physical control. 9 As both Brower and Hodari D. show, these terms are
not synonymous. Formalistic as it may seem, physical force seizure
requires touching, and that never happened in Ewolski.
The second interesting issue is how the Ewolski court interpreted
show of authority seizures. Under Hodari D., a show of authority
intended to seize does not constitute a seizure until the target
subjectively submits.2 ' In Ewolski, however, the suspect shot himself
rather than give in to the police."' It is surprising, therefore, that the
court found that the suspect had submitted to the police show of
authority," and that the police had not seized the suspect's wife and
204. Id. at 5o6. The district court found that police had not seized the suspect because he had never
submitted to official authority. Id.
205. Id.; 489 U.S. 593,598-99 (1989).
206. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599.
207. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 497-99.
208. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (i99i) (stating that the "free to leave" test is "a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for seizure ... effected through a show of authority").
209. See Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) ("In Ewolski this
court held that the use of police coercion to exercise physical control over an armed, barricaded
suspect while he is inside his home amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure...." (emphasis added)).
The question of physical control is indicative of a wider confusion in the courts over the proper seizure
standard. For example, one court held that "a clear show of physical force and assertion of authority"
seized a resisting suspect, even though a "show of physical force" is no different than the "show of
authority" rejected in Hodari D. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 81o, 819 (3d Cir. 1997).
21o. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625,629.
2H1. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 499.
212. Id. at 506; see also Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475 F.3d 1049, 1o76 (9th Cir. 2007) (Callahan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 506) ("In my view, the better, more reasonable, interpretation
of submission for the purposes of barricaded or surrounded suspects is that the person submits by
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child even though they were in the house with the suspect, because they
had been "free to walk away. 213 The Ewolski rule, therefore, is that
police seize a barricaded suspect by surrounding the house with intent to
make a seizure. Encirclement must be coercive to effect a seizure: "[b]y
laying siege to [the] house, breaking [a] door and windows, and
employing pepper gas, the police accomplished a de facto house
arrest."2 '4 The problem with the court finding a show of authority seizure
is that under Hodari D. restricting the suspect's freedom does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment unless the suspect is subdued by
physical force, or gives up."5 Because neither of these events applied in
Ewolski, the court was not correct to apply the objective "free to leave"
test.
b. Fisher v. City of San Jose
The second notable case is Fisher v. City of San Jose, which to date
has produced two published Ninth Circuit opinions and has been ordered
for rehearing en banc"1 The first opinion, though no longer good law,
contains an important analysis of seizure in the home that differs
markedly from Ewolski" 7 In Fisher I, the court held that even if
encirclement equates with physical force, the suspect becomes "un-
seized" when he refuses to give up."' The court began by assuming that
police encirclement was a "show of force" equivalent to "application of
physical force" seizure-the same approach the Sixth Circuit had taken
in Ewolski."9 The court then added a twist. Because Fisher had remained
free in the home, the show of force had not completely controlled him."
remaining barricaded or remaining in the home.").
213. See Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 507. Writing in dissent, Judge Hull faulted the majority's logic:
[I]t is obvious that all members of the Lekan family were affected by the actions of the
police... consequently I believe the Lekans were in the custody of the defendant officers in
the sense that the officers had affirmatively acted to deprive all of them of their liberty.
Id. at 518 (Hull, J., dissenting); see also Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1187
(ioth Cir. 2001) ("One need not be the target of a search or be the person named in an arrest warrant
to be 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). In any event, the majority's reasoning
probably does not survive Brendlin v. California. 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007) (holding that both driver
and passengers are seized during a traffic stop).
214. Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 564 (citing Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 506-07) (identifying a seizure from
"use of police coercion to exercise control over an armed, barricaded suspect while he is inside his
home").
215. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625, 629.
216. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952,965 (9th Cir. 207) (Judge Kozinski's order).
217. See, Fisher, 475 F.3 d at 1057-68. The second Fisher opinion accepted the defendant's
stipulation that Fisher was seized when the police surrounded the house. See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965.
By doing so it avoided the seizure issue entirely.
2 8. Fisher, 475 F.3d at io6o.
219. Id. at io64.
220. Id.
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Applying Hodari D., the court found that Fisher had "escaped" the
police and could be seized again. 2'
This approach, while novel, made little sense. If police could seize
Fisher by confining him in his house, he should remain seized for as long
as he stays there and the police stay outside. Because the police never
restrained Fisher's freedom to move within his home, his moving from
room to room can hardly be an escape. Only two positions matter: that of
the police surrounding the home and that of the suspect inside the home.
If this dynamic remains unchanged, the suspect should remain seized.2
If one strips away the assumption that the police seized Fisher by
surrounding his home, Fisher I is a strict application of Hodari D. to
home standoffs. The court found that Fisher had submitted to the police
show of authority only "at the end of the standoff, when he ultimately
submitted.., by agreeing while still in his house to be placed under
arrest.223 This finding is in line with Hodari D., which requires subjective
submission.24 The consequence, however, is that exhibitions of authority
will never seize a barricaded suspect until the standoff has ended. In that
case, police can seize a barricaded suspect only by applying physical
force. 5 Because physical force can arrest a suspect without bringing him
into custody, police can seize a barricaded suspect each time they try to
subdue him, so long as they do not succeed in taking him into custody226
Therefore, the court held that the police seized Fisher when they tossed a
throw-phone into the house and shot tear gas canisters through his
windows. 7
The greatest practical difference between the Ewolski and Fisher I
analyses is that the former will consider suspects seized at an earlier stage
of the standoff. While this recognizes that police sieges are highly
coercive and thus worthy of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, its doctrinal
221. See id. ("[F]isher remained subject to seizure or arrest-and related entries into his home-
after the arrival of the MERGE [Mobile Emergency Response Group and Equipment] team even if he
had been seized earlier, just as would an individual shot by the police who continued to flee
thereafter."). The district court provided a good account of Fisher's daring escape:
Mr. Fisher states that although the message to come outside was repeated over and over,
and although he did not believe the police would go away, he simply continued about his
business in the apartment. He watched television and finished drinking the twelve-pack of
beer that he had purchased earlier in the day.
Fisher v. City of San Jose, No. C-o-21192-PVT, at 3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2004) (order granting
plaintiff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law re: warrantless arrest) (citations omitted).
222. See LAFAVE, supra note 124, at § 9.4(d) (declaring the Hodari D. test unhelpful when there is
no movement at all by the suspect).
223. Fisher, 475 F.3d at lO64.
224. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,625,629 (1991).
225. Fisher, 475 F.3d at lO64-65.
226. See id. at lO63-64.
227. Id. at 1o64. Presumably, the police also seized Fisher when they threw in flash-bangs, which
are designed to disorient victims and can cause severe injuries. See, e.g., United States v. Ankeny, 358
F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (D. Or. 2005) (flash-bang severely burned defendant).
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underpinnings are tenuous. Moreover, section 1983 plaintiffs in
constructive seizure standoffs seem to lose despite their continuous
seizure."'5 The reason for this counterintuitive result is that courts that
apply a generous test for seizure also apply a generous test for exigent
circumstances. 2 9
B. THE EXISTENCE AND DURATION OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN
ARMED STANDOFFS
Exigent circumstances are difficult to apply to home standoffs.
Many, if not most home standoffs have trivial beginnings, such as the
towing of a pickup truck,3' a health code inspection, 3' or a noise
complaint.32 Other standoffs begin more ominously, with shots fired33 or
the commission of a crime.234 Even when the initial encounter is serious
enough to justify an exigency, however, the danger may pass over the
course of a protracted siege. Case law suggests that exigent circumstances
will only excuse a warrantless arrest when there is danger and not
enough time to feasibly get a warrant.35 For police to understand when
exigent circumstances apply during a standoff, they must know the
factors that create an exigency, and the factors that perpetuate an
exigency.
r. Exigent Circumstances in Armed Standoffs
The first prong of the exigency test is whether an event is dangerous
enough to create exigent circumstances.36 This question focuses on the
suspect's actions and the circumstances surrounding the event."37 Because
courts weigh exigent circumstances under the totality of the
circumstances, to provide an answer we must look to the specific facts
courts have used to decide armed standoff exigency cases.3'
228. See, e.g., Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 572 (6th Cir. 2006); Ewolski v. City
of Brunswick, 287 F.3 d 492, 496 (6th Cir. 2002).
229. See infra notes 282-O and accompanying text (describing the Sixth Circuit's approach to
analyzing exigencies during armed standoffs).
230. See O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3 d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1994).
231. See Alexander v. City of San Francisco, 29 F.3 d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1994).
232. See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 2007).
233. See Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 559 (suspect had "fired his gun into the ground and into the air
to frighten away from his property a group of minors who had been taunting him").
234. See United States v. Lavan, io F. SUpp. 2d 377, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (bank robbery suspect
fled into apartment).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 3984).
236. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); see also Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
237. See cases cited supra note 236.
238. See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 850 (6th Cir. 2007) ("One such exception [to
the warrant requirement] arises when, considering the totality of the circumstances, an officer
reasonably finds that sufficient exigent circumstances exist, such as a risk of danger to police or
others.") (citation omitted).
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2. The Suspect Has a Weapon
The touchstone question during a standoff is whether the suspect's
being armed creates exigent circumstances."' The mere presence of a gun
does not itself create an exigency. 40 When the suspect brandishes a gun,
however, the scales tip towards exigency. 4' Therefore, there are no
exigent circumstances when a suspect appears in his doorway holding a
rifle on his shoulder and shouts "Get out of here! 114 2 because he has
neither pointed his gun at anyone nor threatened to use it.24
3 On the
other hand, when the suspect points his or her gun at police-even
inadvertently- or the police reasonably think he or she has, the line
towards exigency has been crossed.2' 4 For instance, a suspect who shines
a red dot towards police officers creates exigent circumstances when they
reasonably believe he has pointed a laser-sighted weapon at them. 45
Stronger yet are cases where police respond to shots fired. Police may,
for example, enter without a warrant when the suspect has fired shots to
scare his neighbors.46 But even shooting will not create an exigency by
itself. To justify warrantless search the police must have additional
information that the suspect was dangerous.247 For instance, shooting a
gun into the ground in the presence of minors is sufficiently
threatening, 48 while shooting a gun into the air to celebrate New Year's
is not. 249 The clearest example, of course, is when police know the suspect
has just shot another person.2 0 The suspect's past history is also relevant
to weighing danger. When police know they have been called to the
suspect's house in the past for shooting guns, they infer a greater
propensity for violence. 5' Therefore, in order to justify exigency, the
239. See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3 d 673, 67I-8O (9 th Cir. 1993).
240. See id. (finding exigent circumstances did not cover officers' search of unoccupied tent to
recover firearm inside); see also United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1167 (6th Cir. 1984) (plain
view does not create exigency).
241. See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475 F.3 d 1049, 1968 (9 th Cir. 2007).
242. O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 99
o , 993 (6th Cir. 1994).
243. Id. at 997-98.
244. See Fisher, 475 F.3d at Io68 (noting that Fisher was an immediate threat when he pointed a
rifle at officers while "intoxicated, rambling about his Second Amendment rights .... tinkering
repeatedly with seventeen more rifles, and making threatening comments").
245. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 502, 58 (3d Cir. 2003).
246. See Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2006).
247. Causey v. City of Bay City, 442 F.3d 524, 533 (6th Cir. 2006); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d
1367, 1369, 1375 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding exigent circumstances existed where gunman was suicidal and
possibly homicidal, threatening to kill police officers, and had fired shots).
248. See Estate of Bing, 456 F.3 d at 565.
249. See Causey, 442 F.3 d at 533 ("[T]he gunshots heard by the neighbor did not present an
immediate threat. Instead, the plaintiffs were simply celebrating another holiday in their idiosyncratic
way.").
250. See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding exigent
circumstances existed during the standoff because police reasonably believed the suspect had just shot
and killed a fellow police officer).
251. See Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 560.
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police must sense danger, to themselves or to others, no matter what the
suspect has done with a weapon.
3. The Suspect Has Threatened Others
Making threats is one way to establish danger. The strongest cases
are when the suspect directly threatens to kill police officers."52
Comments carry less weight when a third party reports a threat,253 or
when the suspect makes a veiled threat that merely suggests violence."
While they surely factor into the equation, they do not convey the same
degree of danger as a direct threat made when the suspect could
reasonably follow through. Suspects can also create exigent
circumstances if they threaten to harm themselves. 55
4. The Suspect May Have Hostages
External factors are critical in weighing exigencies."' The most
important question is whether the suspect has hostages or victims
trapped in the house. Even when police know an armed suspect is most
likely alone, an exigency is probable when they do not "know for certain
whether there were any other persons inside." '257 In one example, police
responding to a call entered the home of a suspect who had been
screaming at someone and firing shots."' Because the officers reasonably
believed the suspect was threatening someone inside the house, exigent
circumstances justified their entry, even though the suspect was in fact
alone and shouting into a telephone. 59 When the police know an armed
and dangerous suspect has captives, an exigency exists almost as a matter
of law.'. However, this presumption only lasts while the victims are in
danger. Once police have freed the victims, the exigency ends unless
there is another cause of danger. 6 '
252. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3 d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (suspect threatened to
kill negotiator if she entered home); Alexander v. City of San Francisco, 29 F.3 d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.
1994) (suspect shouted from inside house "I'm going to get my gun and use it"); Hancock, 958 F.2d at
1369 (suspect told police dispatcher "if you send any cops over here, I'll kill them").
253. United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1i58, ii6o (6th Cir. 1984) (informant warned police that
"[i]f you get out of the car and attempt to arrest these people they will shoot you. They have done
made the comment that they will kill any law that tries to arrest them.").
254. See Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3 d 492, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (suspect "told his brother
the night before that his guns were 'loaded and ready').
255. Cf. Buchanon ex reL Estate of Buchanon v. Maine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 45, 57-58 (D. Me. 2006)
(holding that a mentally-ill man was an immediate threat to himself so as to justify sheriffs' warrantless
"welfare check" entry).
256. See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 528 (5th Cir. 1994) (detailing various external factors
that were important to determining whether the police's warrantless behavior was justified).
257. Id.
258. Dickerson v. McClellan, ioi F.3d II5i, ii6o (6th Cir. 1998).
259. Id.
260. See Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 502 (6th Cir. 2002).
261. See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (suspect's wife left the house
at the' beginning of the siege); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3 d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
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5. The Surrounding Community Is in Danger
In addition to police and hostages, barricade situations can also
threaten the surrounding community because of the extreme violence
they can cause. The sides may exchange barrages of gunre26 and the
police may destroy the suspect's house by setting it on fire
263 or even by
dropping an aerial bomb onto it.264 The safety of neighbors, therefore, is
an important factor in deciding whether exigent circumstances excuse a
warrantless entry, 6' especially when the standoff attracts a crowd of
bystanders to the dangerous area. 66 Only when the police have
evacuated neighboring residents can there be no threat to the public.67
6. Remoteness and the Potential for Escape
Finally, geographic location and the potential for escape can
determine whether there is an exigency. Exigent circumstances may exist
where the suspect's home is too remote to call for backup. Similarly,
the police may make a warrantless entry when poor surrounding cover
makes it dangerous for them to wait out an armed suspect or to retreat.
69
When there are too few police to prevent a suspect from escaping, courts
are likely to find an exigency.7 If the suspect threatens to escape
violently, the exigency can last for hours.27'
police were justified in making a limited warrantless entry to free a kidnap victim, but were not
justified in continuing to search the apartment because the exigency had ended when the police freed
the captive).
262. See, e.g., O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990,994 (6th Cir. 1994).
263. See, e.g., Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3 d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2oo6).
264. See In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d 945,951 (3d Cir. 1995).
265. See Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 564 ("[B]ing had shown a willingness to fire weapons in his
neighborhood and could have harmed others in an instant with little effort.").
266. See United States v. Salvador, 74o F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1984).
267. For an example where police thoroughly prepared for standoff contingencies, see Sharrar v.
Felsing, 128 F.3d 8Io, 815 (3d Cir. 1997).
The police created an inner and outer perimeter around Brigden's residence. Capt.
McClory ordered the evacuation of all residents in the inner perimeter. He dispatched
someone to contact the schools in the area to divert their normal bus routes and keep at
school all children who lived in the immediate vicinity of Brigden's residence. The fire
station was ordered to accept evacuees, fire trucks and ambulances were told to come to the
scene without lights and sirens; the City marina was closed so that no boats could leave the
harbor; and the bridge which provided the sole vehicular access to the City was blocked.
Id. (citations omitted).
268. See Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Ist Cir. 1995).
269. Id.
[O]nce their... strategy had positioned several officers in unexpectedly vulnerable
positions against the thin cabin walls, they could neither remain in their positions
indefinitely nor safely terminate the impasse by attempting to retreat across the moonlit
cabin clearing without directly exposing themselves to potential gunfire. Thus, safe and
indefinite containment.., no longer remained a practicable alternative.
Id. (citation omitted).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson,
66o F.2d 749, 752-53 (9 th Cir. 1981).
271. United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735,739 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Therefore, exigent circumstances generally exist when the suspect is
armed, has shown or is showing a propensity for violence, and has the
immediate ability to hurt people inside the house or outside the home.
7. The Duration of Exigent Circumstances During a Standoff
There is a circuit split over how long exigent circumstances last
during armed standoffs. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, danger alone
cannot justify a warrantless entry.72 Instead, exigency analysis has two
prongs: immediate danger and sufficient time.73 The first prong is
focused on the suspect, while the second-time-focuses on police
resources. Police may enter without a warrant only when the delay
needed to obtain a warrant would increase the danger to the police or
the public.274 "The initial exigency can dissipate either because the danger
posed by the targeted individual decreases or because, with the passage
of time, resources become available that allow the police both to
maintain safety and to obtain a warrant." '275 In Fisher, the suspect was
seized when the police surrounded the house in the early morning."'
Over the next several hours, the suspect was neither heard from nor seen
with a weapon, and the other occupants of the house and surrounding
neighbors were evacuated. 7 During the same time period, dozens of
officers responded to the standoff, including several who returned to the
police station before it ended."'5 If those officers could file police reports,
why couldn't they seek a warrant? The Third Circuit considered similar
facts in Sharrar v. Felsing:
The police have not satisfactorily explained why, when the
house was completely surrounded by an armed SWAT team,
they could not secure the premises while they went to procure
an arrest warrant, especially in light of the fact that Municipal
Court Judge Calloway was sitting on the bench at the police
station during this entire episode.2
Therefore, under the facts of the case, the Fisher II court held that the
exigency had dissipated over the course of the standoff."' By the time in
the afternoon when the police shot tear gas into the suspect's home, the
intrusion was not excused by exigent circumstances.5




276. Id. at 962.
277. Id. at 966.
278. Id. at 967.
279. 128 F.3 d 8ro, 820 (3d Cir. 1997).
280. Fisher, 509 F.3d at 968.
281. Id.
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By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has taken the view that an exigency
only terminates when the factors creating the exigency are terminated 2
In Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, two and a half hours elapsed
between the time the police surrounded the house and the time police
shot tear gas through the windows, thereby seizing him 83 The court held
the exigency did not terminate during this time.84 "The passage of time
did not terminate the exigency because the ticking of the clock did
nothing to cut off Bing's access to the gun, or cure him of his willingness
to fire it, or move to safety the people who refused to evacuate. '2s5 In
short, time cannot negate exigency factors beyond the police's control.
As for factors within police control, the court held that neither the
on-scene investigation nor the execution of police strategy had negated
the exigency."' To reach this result, the court had to distinguish its prior
holding in O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids. 87 In O'Brien, an exigency
had dissipated when the police waited four and a half hours to execute a
warrantless search, during which period the suspect had done nothing
threatening."8s The Estate of Bing majority labeled this "procrastination"
materially distinguishable to their facts, in which the police had waited
one hour for backup and then spent one and a half hours putting
together a plan."9 Therefore, under the Sixth Circuit test, so long as the
suspect remains dangerous and the police remain reasonably busy, there
are exigent circumstances 9 °
282. Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3 d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (978)).
283. Id. at 56o-6I.
284. Id. at 565 ("Because the passage of time did not make Bing any less dangerous, Bing posed a
continuous immediate danger.") (emphasis added).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 566-67.
287. 23 F.3d 990, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994).
288. Id.
289. Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 568. On close inspection, it is difficult to determine on what factual
grounds the Estate of Bing court drew its distinction. The court in O'Brien stated that police could
have gotten a warrant because they "waited four-and-a-half hours before deciding to use the probe."
O'Brien, 23 F.3d at 998. That wait does not equate to procrastination, though, because the court
elsewhere revealed that during this time the police had taken "control of the area, gathered
information, and developed a response plan." Id. at 997. These are the exact same activities the Estate
of Bing court relied on in reaching the opposite conclusion. Estate of Bing, 456 F.3d at 566 ("[An
exigency does not terminate merely because the police wait for backup, or because they take the time
reasonably necessary to confirm information and execute a plan.").
290. The Fifth Circuit follows the Sixth Circuit approach. See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514,
528 (5th Cir. 2004).
Finally, Hicks's characterization of the stand-off as simply a five-hour period where nothing
happened is disingenuous. In fact, the record shows that the SWAT team organizer was
notified at 2:oo a.m. that the team was needed. Once the team was assembled at the sheriff's
office and all of the relevant equipment was gathered, it left for Hicks's home at
approximately 3:45 or 4:oo a.m. The team then formulated its plan of action, and it
conducted visual, aerial, and thermal surveillance to determine the least-risky way of
entering Hicks's home. Finally, it fired tear gas and pepper spray into Hicks's home and,
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The Ninth Circuit test in Fisher suffers one overarching flaw. The
court did not say what would happen when exigent circumstances
dissipate but the police "during the standoff [make] no further intrusions
into the home for purposes of effecting the arrest...... This avoided the
tricky question of when exigent circumstances dissipate during an armed
standoff. The court concluded that police do not violate the Fourth
Amendment until they make some new "entry" without the protection of
an exigency. The problem is that this creates a new, second warrant
requirement. The police do not need a warrant to keep the suspect seized
inside the house. But to enter the house to arrest an already seized
suspect the police need an arrest warrant. This does not fit with our
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. If the police seize a suspect
inside his home, they need either an arrest warrant or exigent
circumstances.292 If the police have neither a warrant nor an exigency, the
seizure is unconstitutional.2 93 Therefore, the result the Fisher court should
have reached is that the seizure became unconstitutional at some
discernible moment during the siege when exigent circumstances no
longer existed.
V. TOWARDS A COHERENT APPROACH TOWARDS STANDOFF PROCEDURE
AND RESOLUTION
In applying Payton v. New York294 to confrontations with barricaded
suspects, lower courts have failed to develop a workable standard for
when police must obtain a warrant.95 As a result, the police are forced to
juggle facts in guessing whether they have seized the suspect, and if so
whether exigent circumstances protect their actions. What makes this
especially bothersome is that the main purpose of Payton is to draw a
bright constitutional line for police. When police encounter "a rule which
cannot be applied correctly with a fair degree of consistency by well-
intentioned police officers," the entire exercise becomes futile.9
The manner in which we identify seizures will determine the rights
we afford barricaded suspects, and thus we must base our choice on solid
social underpinnings. Adopting the Sixth Circuit's approach, for
example, will cause police to seize suspects the moment they surround a
house. This means courts will examine subsequent police behavior for
after this did not work, it entered the home. In light of the fact that the police believed that
Hicks was armed, had just killed a police officer, and did not want to be captured, exigent
circumstances existed.
Id.
291. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3 d 952, 962 n.9 (9 th Cir. 2007).
292. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (r98o).
293. Id.
294. See generally id.
295. See supra Part IV.
296. LAFAVE, supra note 124 (discussing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. i97o)).
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objective reasonableness,297 rather than under the more forgiving "shocks
the conscience" substantive due process test.29 Lowering this threshold
would give legal recourse to the victims of unreasonable police actions,
and the resulting litigation would encourage police departments to
develop nonconfrontational standoff protocols, and to better train their
officers on how to handle mentally ill suspects. Social policy therefore
favors a lenient seizure test.
The problem is that Fourth Amendment seizure doctrine is not
lenient. The objective "free to leave" seizure test from Mendenhall does
not apply to suspects who are resisting the police."l That leaves
Hodari D., which requires the barricaded suspect to actually submit to
police authority or be physically subdued in order to be seized."° This is
not an attractive option. First, the physical force or submission test
ignores intrusions on a suspect's privacy within his home so long as police
stay outside. While we tolerate coercive shows of authority on public
sidewalks, it is harder to forgive such coercion when the target is at
home. This principle reflects Payton's edict that privacy reaches its apex
"when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions on an
individual's home." '' It is hard to believe that the Fourth Amendment
condones police driving tanks onto front yards, demanding surrender
through bullhorns, shining floodlights through windows, and monitoring
residents with snipers. Nevertheless, every court to consider the issue has
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does apply to home standoffs,
though their reasoning has been questionable. 2
There are some policy arguments in favor of not applying the Fourth
Amendment to surrounded suspects, however. Police would not need to
worry about an arrest warrant requirement when waiting out a
barricaded suspect. This would deter officers from attempting to enter
the home rather than worry about the constitutional implications of
surrounding the house. Although this makes sense, it is wrong to use the
warrant requirement as a sword of Damocles for the police to avoid.
Rather, making the warrant requirement rule easy for police to apply
encourages them to pursue warrants whenever possible. This both
encourages restraint and introduces the neutral eye of a magistrate into
the process.
A second argument against requiring arrest warrants for armed
standoffs is that they serve no purpose. The job of a magistrate is to
decide whether or not the police have probable cause to arrest the
297. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,396 (1989).
298. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 883, 846 0997).
299. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
300. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625, 629 (i99i).
301. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (i98o).
302. See supra notes 04-2 1 and accompanying text.
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suspect.3"3 Under normal circumstances, they have no say in how the
police conduct the arrest. This means that the presence or absence of an
arrest warrant has no effect on what courts are most concerned about-
unreasonably overbearing and violent police activity.3 4
Two responses can be made to this argument. First, the existence of
probable cause is particularly important in home standoffs because many
standoffs develop from minor crimes.3 5 The magistrate is best suited to
decide whether the suspect truly needs to be apprehended or not."
Second, some courts have held that certain police tactics must be
approved in advance by the magistrate tasked with signing the arrest
warrant.3" In Langford v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
decided that the use of a mechanized battering ram to gain entry to drug
houses was "so destructive that its use against residences generally
infringes on occupants' and owners' rights to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures."3s To cabin its use, therefore, the
court held that "deployment of the ram to enter dwellings must be
considered presumptively unreasonable unless authorized in advance by
a neutral magistrate, and unless exigent circumstances develop at the
time of entry."'" The magistrate therefore can play an important role in
armed standoffs.
Barricaded suspects occupy a gap in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that the courts must close. The only true way for courts to
do this is to extend the objective "free to ignore the police" seizure test
to resisting suspects. Doing so will require them to change the concept of
submission. The best way to accomplish this was articulated by Judge
Callahan in her Fisher v. City of San Jose (Fisher I) dissent." Under her
approach, the "better, more reasonable, interpretation of submission for
the purposes of barricaded or surrounded suspects is that the person
submits by remaining barricaded or remaining in the home. 3 . The
suspect is subjectively submitting to the encirclement by staying put. It
does not matter that the suspect has not surrendered.
The problem with Callahan's position is that some suspects who
remain barricaded have not "accepted that there is... only one peaceful
outcome-his or her eventual surrender. 3 2 The obvious example is a
303. Daila v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979).
304. Id. But see Langford v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 822, 828 (Cal. 1987).
305. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
306, See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text (describing how a serious standoff can have
paltry beginnings).
307. See Langford, 729 P.2d at 828.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 826.
310. See 475 F.3 d 1049, io7o (9th Cir. 2007) (Callahan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1076.
312. Id.
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surrounded suspect who exchanges gunfire with police. Such a suspect
has not submitted in any form, even if he is confined within the walls of
his home. But by staying inside, even this unbowed suspect has given up
his freedom to go about his business. The Sixth Circuit made this
argument persuasively in Ewolski:
Mr. Lekan clearly would have been seized for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment had the police nailed shut the doors and windows
of his house with him inside. The actions of the police in the instant
case were no less effective in restraining Mr. Lekan's movements and,
therefore, should be considered a seizure.
313
This is a fine line, and perhaps it is untenable. Its validity depends
entirely on the belief that there is a big difference between fleeing from
police on public streets and refusing to leave the privacy of the home. It
is the same belief that precipitated Payton v. New York.314
If a court accepts that barricaded suspects have submitted to the
police show of authority, it must then apply the Bostick "free to ignore
the police" test to decide whether or not a seizure has occurred. 15 In this
respect, a home standoff is analogous to a bus search because, like a
passenger on a bus, the barricaded suspect has voluntarily confined• 316
himself to the four corners of his home. Under these circumstances, the
Court in United States v. Drayton suggested factors that would
constitute a seizure: "application of force,.., intimidating movement, ..
overwhelming show of force.... brandishing of weapons,... blocking of
exits,... threat[s],... [and] command[s]. ' " Each of these factors exists
to some extent during a standoff. Police encircle and isolate the suspect
to establish control and prevent escape, issue commands and threats, and
frequently brandish weapons as part of an overwhelming display of force.
Following Drayton to its logical end, such conduct would seize the
barricaded suspect.
Exigent circumstances doctrine under Dorman suggests a multitude
of factors to police that, taken together, can create an exigency."I When
applied to barricade situations, however, courts struggle to find
consistency in exigency analysis. First, courts ignore factors beyond
immediate danger and the chance of escape.3 9 Second, courts take
opposing positions when weighing the need to protect against the
continuous threat of a barricaded gunman against the ability of police to
313. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 506 (6th Cir. 2002).
314. 445 U.S. 573 (I98O).
315. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (I991).
316. See United States v. Jerez, lO8 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1997). For an examination of bus
seizure cases, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
317. 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).
318. Dorman v. United States, 485 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 197o).
319. See supra Part I.C.
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get a warrant during a protracted standoff.32° The best approach to this
second question, I propose, lies somewhere in between.
While immediate danger and escape are undoubtedly common
exigencies in a standoff, other factors are also important and often
overlooked. One such factor is whether police entered the home
peacefully. Although some courts have considered peaceable entry, they
have not given it special weight.32' They should. Police should be
discouraged from using excessive amounts of force, both in entering the
home and in surrounding the home. Even if they never enter the home,
police conduct during a standoff is frequently militaristic, overbearing,
and intimidating. Such conduct is unwise in nonhostage situations. In
gauging exigent circumstances, therefore, courts should consider the
peacefulness of the police both during entry and the standoff.
A second factor that deserves greater attention is the gravity of the
underlying offense. Barricades usually involve great danger at some
point. But that does not mean that they always begin violently. Normal
encounters often become dangerous when the suspect decides to resist.
What begins with routine policing or an administrative act can quickly
turn into something exponentially more serious. This presents few issues
when the suspect is at fault. The problem is that suspects frequently do
not cause standoffs. Cases such as Fisher show how police can
manufacture danger."' Other cases, like O'Brien, show how crude police
tactics can provoke otherwise benign suspects towards violent
retaliation.3"3 Indeed, by tossing rocks at windows and breaking glass, the
police in Fisher and O'Brien did more to worsen the standoff than to
resolve it.3"4 The result is that police can create their own exigencies.
Courts should recognize exigency factors that encourage good police
work. As we have seen, police should contain barricaded suspects while
keeping a low profile and open channels for communication. When
police stray from this model, courts should not bail them out through
exigent circumstances. Therefore, the gravity of the offense the police
were responding to deserves great respect. Courts should hesitate,
though, to give weight to the gravity of offenses committed after police
seized the suspect by surrounding the home. By doing so, police would
not have a Fourth Amendment incentive to behave badly.
Exigent circumstances doctrine should be as dynamic as the
situations it interprets. To this end, I propose the following test. First,
courts should distinguish between "planned" and "unplanned" standoffs.
320. See supra Part III.
321. See generally Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007).
322. See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955-56.
323. See O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1994) (police broke window
during standoff with emotionally disturbed man, causing him to fire ten shots at police).
324. Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956; O'Brien, 23 F.3 d at 994.
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Police should automatically seek a warrant when they expect a standoff
in advance. They know the suspect is barricaded at home and going
nowhere, and accordingly must anticipate making a home arrest.
Furthermore, given the time to make plans, the police have the resources
to call for help. Courts should therefore presume the need for a warrant.
By contrast, the initial presumption should be against warrants when
police inadvertently enter into a standoff. Responding to a barricaded
suspect requires police to set a perimeter, call for reinforcements and
negotiators, and evacuate residents, all while keeping tabs on a
dangerous suspect. Procuring a warrant under these circumstances would
cause more harm than good.
The presumption should end, however, the moment police
preoccupation lapses into delay or waiting. Unlike the ad hoc Sixth
Circuit approach, courts should look to Place and Sharpe for guidance."
5
During protracted police standoffs, therefore, exigent circumstances
should last so long as police work diligently and expeditiously towards
resolving the crisis. But when spare resources make it reasonable for
police to get a warrant, they must do so. The clearest such circumstance
is when police call for SWAT team assistance. At that moment, the
police know the suspect is barricaded in his or her house. They intend to
make the arrest in the home. Furthermore, they have the wherewithal to
call in reinforcements. Barring unforeseen events, courts should presume
that SWAT teams are capable of arriving with warrant in hand, or at
least with a warrant application under way.
CONCLUSION
The barricaded suspect occupies an uncertain place in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Having retreated into their homes, such
suspects fall within the strict warrant protection of Payton v. New York."'
But Payton and lower court precedent provide few answers when police
cannot enter the house or force the suspect out. This is unacceptable
because the rights of suspects and municipalities all depend on the clarity
of guidance given to police officers. Therefore, courts should simplify the
test. First, a suspect should be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes
when he is surrounded in his home and no longer free to ignore the
police. Second, courts should presume a warrant requirement when
police have time to plan a standoff. When standoffs are beyond
anticipation, however, exigent circumstances should last only so long as
the police are too busy to seek a warrant.
325. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (i985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see
also supra Part II.C.2.
326. 445 U.S. 573 (i98o).
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